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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
DANIEL J. MARONEY, : Case No. 20030519-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant/Defendant Daniel J. Maroney ("Appellant" or "Mr. Maroney") refers 
this Court to his opening brief and replies to the state's brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The state concedes that this case must be remanded for findings regarding the 
accuracy and relevance of information as to treatment Mr. Maroney received twenty 
years ago. This case must also be remanded for findings as to the accuracy and relevance 
of information that Mr. Maroney was violent in the past because Appellant "brought [this 
issue] to the attention of the sentencing judge" (Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (2003)) 
as well as "the alternative characterization urged by the defendant." State v. Veteto , 2000 
UT 62, ^ [13-14, 6 P.3d 1133. Under Utah law, a sentencing judge is required to make 
findings as to the accuracy and relevance of contested information under these 
circumstances. Additionally, a new sentencing is required because the contested 
information affected the sentence. 
The sentencing court also committed plain error in considering and failing to 
strike unreliable multiple hearsay in the presentence report, diagnostic evaluation and 
accompanying letters. Due process is violated where unreliable information is 
considered regardless of whether that information is in the presentence report or other 
documents. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO DETERMINE THE 
ACCURACY AND RELEVANCE OF CONTESTED INFORMATION 
REQUIRES REMAND. 
A. THE STATE CONCEDES THAT THIS CASE MUST BE 
REMANDED FOR FINDINGS ON THE ACCURACY AND 
RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION REGARDING PREVIOUS SEX 
OFFENDER TREATMENT. 
The state concedes that the trial court failed to resolve the contested information 
as to whether Mr. Maroney had received formal sex offender treatment in the past and 
that such failure requires that "the case should be remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of accuracy and relevance concerning . . . the degree to which defendant's 
20-year-old therapy was sex offender treatment " State's Brief ("S.B.") at 23, 28, 29. 
Given the state's concession and the record showing that defense counsel contested the 
accuracy of this information which was considered as part of the sentencing proceeding, 
the case should be remanded at the very least for the purpose of resolving the accuracy 
and relevance of information suggesting that Mr. Maroney received formal sex offender 
treatment in the past. 
B. THIS CASE MUST ALSO BE REMANDED FOR FINDINGS AS TO 
THE ACCURACY AND RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION THAT 
MR. MARONEY WAS VIOLENT IN THE PAST. 
Although the state claims that Appellant did not sufficiently contest the accuracy 
and relevance of the claims of violence so as to trigger the requirement of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999) that the trial judge resolve this issue, a review of the record 
demonstrates that defense counsel did in fact make it clear to the judge that Mr. Maroney 
contested the relevancy and accuracy of the information indicating that he had been 
violent in the past. The state claims that Mr. Maroney did not preserve his challenge to 
the relevance and accuracy of information that he had been violent in the past even 
though Mr. Maroney made it clear to the judge that he contested the information and the 
prosecutor responded by conceding that the information was not relevant. According to 
the state, a defendant must not only make it clear to the sentencing judge that he contests 
the challenged information, but must also explicitly ask the judge to make a factual 
finding as to the relevance and accuracy of the information for the protections of section 
77-18-1(6) and State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d 404, to come into play. See_ S.B. at 
25-28. 
Contrary to the state's assertions, neither the language of the statute nor Utah case 
law makes such a requirement; instead, a trial judge is required to make findings as to the 
relevance and accuracy of information in presentence reports whenever alleged 
inaccuracies are challenged or brought to the trial judge's attention. See Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 77-18-l(6)(a). Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) states, M[a]ny alleged inaccuracies in 
the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the 
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge . . . ." IcL (emphasis added). Subsection l(6)(b) reiterates that a party must 
''challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of 
sentencing . . . " or the matter is waived. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b). The plain 
language of the statute therefore requires only that the defendant challenge the accuracy 
of the presentence report by bringing the inaccuracies to the attention of the trial judge. 
See State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995) (plain language of a statute controls its 
interpretation). 
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ [42-46, and its progeny likewise do not support the state's 
claim that a defendant must formally request a factual finding in order to trigger the 
protections of section 77-18-1(6). In Jaeger, the Court; reiterated the language of the 
statute which requires the defendant to bring any alleged inaccuracies to the attention of 
the trial judge. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 42. The Court concluded that where a sentencing 
court has been informed of the alleged inaccuracies, section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires the 
sentencing judge "to consider the party's objections to the report, make findings on the 
record as to whether the information objected to was accurate, and determine on the 
record whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing." Jaeger, 1999 UT 
1,145. 
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In State v. Veteto. 2000 UT 62, ffijl3-14, 6 P.3d 1133, the Court again reiterated 
the language of the statute requiring a defendant to bring any alleged inaccuracies to the 
attention of the trial court during sentencing in order to give rise to the requirement that 
the sentencing court resolve the accuracy and relevance of contested information. The 
Court indicated that in order to trigger the factual finding requirement of section 77-18-
1(6), the defendant must make the sentencing court aware of his challenges and 
alternative view of the facts, stating "[although the trial court clearly was aware of the 
issues and the alternative characterization urged by defendant, the trial court failed to 
make the specific findings on the record as mandated by the statute." Veteto, 2000 UT 
62, %\5 (emphasis added). Pursuant to Veteto., outlining the claims of error in the 
presentence report is sufficient to trigger the fact finding requirement of section 77-18-
1(6). 
In this case, Mr. Maroney brought to the attention of the sentencing court his 
claims about the inaccuracy of the information that he had been violent as well as his 
claim about the inaccuracy of the information that he had received formal sex offender 
treatment. After defense counsel contested the accuracy of the information indicating 
that Mr. Maroney had received sex offender treatment, he segued into a discussion of the 
inaccuracy of the information suggesting that Mr. Maroney had been violent. R. 109:9. 
Defense counsel pointed out that the decision of the presentence and diagnostic report 
authors was affected by their belief that Mr. Maroney had been violent with his ex-wife 
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and stepsons, but that the letter from Christina Maroney indicated that Mr. Maroney had 
not been violent with the stepsons or Christina's mother. R. 109:10. Defense counsel 
stated that Christina "never saw violence in the home ever" and that the report "that 
something else existed . . . seemed to be huge with these authors" but was "not well-
founded." R. 109:10. These statements brought Mr. Maroney's claims as to the 
inaccuracies of the reports of violence to the attention of the trial court and made the trial 
judge aware that Mr. Maroney took issue with the claim of violence and instead claimed 
that he had not been violent in the past. 
The fact that this claim as to the inaccuracy of the information regarding violence 
was brought to the court's attention is demonstrated by the fact that the prosecutor 
addressed the challenge to the claim of violence when he first began to speak at 
sentencing. In response to defense counsel's argument that the evaluators seemed 
swayed by the violence twenty years ago even though the home was not violent, the 
prosecutor stated, "first, with regard to the - - the allegations that have been referenced in 
the reports about there having been violence in the home at other times, I agree with 
[defense counsel], I don't think that's relevant to what we're looking at here." 
R. 109:12. Defense counsel's claims that the presentence and diagnostic reports 
inaccurately portrayed violence in Mr. Maroney's home twenty years ago followed by the 
prosecutor's response that any claims of violence were not relevant, unquestionably 
brought to the sentencing court's attention the question of the accuracy and relevance of 
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the information regarding violence. Because the sentencing judge should have been 
clearly aware of the issue and Mr. Maroney's alternative characterization, the issue was 
properly presented to the judge and preserved for review. See Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ]fl5 
(judge must make factual findings as to accuracy and relevance of contested information 
when judge is made "aware of the issues and the alternative characterization urged by the 
defendant"). Accordingly, at the very least, this case must be remanded so that the judge 
can make the required findings as to the accuracy and relevance of the contested 
information regarding violence as well as the contested information regarding previous 
treatment. 
C. A NEW SENTENCING HEARING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE 
ERRORS IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE ACCURACY AND 
RELEVANCE OF CONTESTED INFORMATION REGARDING 
VIOLENCE AND PREVIOUS SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT 
AFFECTED THE SENTENCE. 
In Jaeger, the Court did not vacate the sentence because "Jaeger [did] not contend 
that [the] error affected his sentence." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 46. In that case, where 
defendant was convicted of a homicide and the errors in the presentence report addressed 
peripheral matters such as how extensive the wounds were and whether defendant had a 
clean record after the homicide (Id.), counsel's decision not to claim that the contested 
matters affected the sentence was consistent with the nature of the inaccuracies. Iji. By 
contrast, in this case, the alleged inaccuracies occurred in two areas which the 
presentence evaluators focused on heavily in reaching a decision to recommend prison. 
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They therefore affected the sentence, and a new sentencing hearing is required. 
As defense counsel pointed out, the presentence and diagnostic report authors 
were "very, very concerned" with the focus of any previous counseling Mr. Maroney had 
received. R. 109: 5. The presentence report indicates that it is "very disturbing" that 
Mr. Maroney "continued to place himself in contact with children" and initiated a 
relationship with a woman with two young sons, even though he had been in counseling. 
Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") at 14. Given the fact that under the sentencing 
matrix, Mr. Maroney was on the borderline for an intermediate sanction rather than 
prison (see sentencing matrix in PSI), this alleged failure to benefit from previous 
counseling most certainly impacted on the evaluator's decision to recommend prison. 
The diagnostic evaluation likewise placed great weight on Mr. Maroney ?s failure 
to learn from his previous treatment in deciding to recommend prison. Although the 
diagnostic investigator did not have treatment records and did not know what was 
covered in Mr. Maroney's treatment as part of the previous plea in abeyance agreement, 
he nevertheless asked Mr. Maroney "why he had not learned more about preventing 
future sexual offenses during his treatment" and was critical of Mr. Maroney 5s response, 
saying that Mr. Maroney "blamed" the therapists. Diagnostic evaluation at 5. The 
investigator also took issue with Mr. Maroney's depiction of the treatment and suggested 
he was not being honest when, in fact, there is every indication that the counseling 
Mr. Maroney received twenty years ago was not formal sex offender treatment. IcL_ 
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Although there is nothing indicating that Mr. Maroney received sex offender treatment, 
the investigator went even further in his assumptions about the previous treatment, 
"suggesting] [Mr. Maroney's] careless efforts to remember what he learned in therapy, 
might partially explain his renewed sexual offending." IcL. at 6. Given this focus in the 
report, the investigator's belief that Mr. Maroney failed to benefit from previous 
counseling affected the sentencing recommendation. 
The diagnostic evaluators also focused on the claims that Mr. Maroney had been 
violent in reaching the decision to recommend prison. See diagnostic evaluation at 5, 7, 
8; psychological evaluation at 6. In fact, the psychologist considered it "[o]f great 
concern" that Mr. Maroney denied "using violence towards any of his victims or 
ex-wife." Psychological evaluation at 6. 
Although the sentencing judge did not expressly state that she based the sentence 
in part on Mr. Maroney's prior violence and failure to benefit from previous treatment, 
she did indicate that she had a grave concern that Mr. Maroney was aware of his problem 
but continued to act out and harm young boys. R. 109:19-20. The judge stated: 
In sentencing today, I have to consider a number of different things and to 
the extent that your past conduct tells me about the extent of your disease, 
and I agree with you, it is a disease and you need treatment and you will get 
treatment, I'm exceptionally concerned about the fact that it appears you've 
been actively aware of this for maybe 30 years and that over a 20-year span 
you have acted out, and on more than one occasion and you've harmed 
young boys. 
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R. 109:19-20. This statement intimates that the judge believed that Mr. Maroney had 
obtained information from previous treatment that he failed to utilize. Moreover, a 
sentencing judge's silence does not establish that the sentencing judge did not consider 
the factors in sentencing. See State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214,1J8 n. 6, 73 P.3d 
991 (quoting State v. Helms. 2002 UT 12, If 12, 40 P.3d 626). In this case where the 
matrix was borderline in regard to recommending prison, the evaluators5 consideration of 
reports of violence and failure to benefit from previous treatment figured into the 
decision to recommend prison, and the judge presumably reviewed the reports and was 
aware of the claims, the failure to resolve the contested claims affected the sentence and 
requires a new sentencing hearing. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO STRIKE UNRELIABLE INFORMATION FROM THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT AND DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION AND 
IN CONSIDERING SUCH UNRELIABLE INFORMATION AT 
SENTENCING. 
A. WHILE POST-TRIAL EVALUATIONS CAN BE CONSIDERED BY 
THE SENTENCING JUDGE, DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED WHEN 
THE SENTENCING JUDGE RELIES ON IRRELEVANT OR 
INACCURATE INFORMATION IN SUCH EVALUATIONS. 
While the state is correct that the rules of evidence generally do not apply to 
sentencing hearings and hearsay evidence can be considered at sentencing, the state 
disregards the distinction between simple hearsay that is reliable and multiple or 
otherwise unreliable hearsay. See S.B. at 32-35. The due process protection at 
sentencing requires that a sentence be based on reliable and relevant information. See 
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State v. Wanosik. 2003 UT 34, 79 P.3d 937 (the requirement of rule 22(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure that sentencing judges afford the defendant the opportunity 
to make a statement furthers the due process requirement that sentences be based on 
relevant and reliable information); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utahl985) (due 
process requirement that sentences be based on reliable and relevant information is 
furthered by allowing the prosecution and the defense to present evidence relevant to 
sentencing); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) (the fair administration of 
justice and the integrity of the judicial system require that sentencing decisions be based 
on accurate and reliable information). Although providing the defendant with a copy of 
the presentence report and giving the defendant the opportunity to object is one of the 
means by which courts attempt to meet the sentencing due process requirement (see 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1248), supplying a defendant with a copy of the presentence report is 
not the only requirement for meeting due process concerns at sentencing. See e.g. 
Wanosik, 2003 UT 34, Tfl9 (affording the defendant the opportunity to make a statement 
at sentencing furthers the due process requirement that sentencing decisions be based on 
relevant and reliable information); State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) 
(due process requires that sentencing decision is based on reasonable, reliable and 
relevant information; M[t]he need for evidentiary reliability in sentencing proceeding is 
greater when specific factual issues must be resolved"). 
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Relying on Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977), the state suggests that 
presentence reports are presumptively reliable. S.B. at 35. While the Court did state in 
Gardner that presentence reports are generally reliable, it also recognized "the possibility 
that critical unverified information may be inaccurate and determinative in a particular 
case." Id, n. 10. In fact, because of a concern that the defendant did not have access to 
the presentence report and therefore was unable to challenge the unreliability of that 
report, the Court vacated the sentence in Gardner. When the phrase quoted by the state 
(S.B. at 35) is read in the context of the case, it is evident that Gardner supports the 
proposition that in a given case, a presentence report may contain inaccurate and 
irrelevant information. 
Utah case law likewise supports the notion that presentence reports may contain 
irrelevant and inaccurate information. See e.g. Lipsky, 608 P.2d at!248 ("[a] defendant's 
right to be sentenced on the basis of information that is accurate can be protected only if 
the pre-sentence report is disclosed to him prior to sentencing"). In fact, Jaeger and Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) are premised on the idea that reports may contain inaccurate or 
irrelevant information. See Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 42-47 (judge required to make findings 
on the record as to the relevance and accuracy of contested information in the 
presentence report). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that since the 
impact of errors at sentencing can result in an unduly harsh sentence, the general 
presumption of regularity does not strictly apply to sentencing decisions. State v. Carson, 
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597 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1979) ("[g]iven the volume of cases handled by the courts, 
sentencing may be based on errors which, if made known to the trial judge, could 
produce a different result"). Just as the general presumption of regularity does not apply 
to decisions made by sentencing judges, a presumption of accuracy does not apply to 
presentence reports, particularly in a case such as the present one where Appellant 
contested the accuracy of the information in the trial court and on appeal. Case law does 
not support the state's intimation that presentence reports should be given some latitude 
or general presumption of accuracy. 
B. JOHNSON REQUIRES THAT UNRELIABLE MULTIPLE 
HEARSAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AT SENTENCING REGARDLESS 
OF WHETHER THE UNRELIABLE INFORMATION IS IN THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT OR SOME OTHER DOCUMENT. 
The state seems to suggest that the requirement in Johnson that a sentence not be 
based on multiple hearsay applies only when that multiple hearsay is in a document other 
than the presentence report. S.B. at 36-37. The due process reliability requirement 
applies, however, to any information relied on by the sentencing court, not just 
information found outside the presentence report. In fact, in reaching its decision in 
Johnson, the Court relied on United States v. Weston. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) where 
the unreliable sentencing information was in the presentence report. See Johnson, 856 
P.2d at 1072 (citing Weston, 448 P.2d 626). The state recognizes that Johnson mandates 
that "double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents such a high probability for 
inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for sentencing." S.B. at 36, quoting 
13 
Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071. The state claims, however, that this statement "has never 
been literally applied, especially to PSIs." S.B. at 36. The Supreme Court's holding in 
Johnson and its reliance on Weston and express reference to the multiple hearsay in the 
presentence report in that case belies the state's claim. 
The state also seems to suggest that this Court need consider only whether "the 
post-trial evaluations, taken as a whole, are facially unreliable." S.B. at 39. Due process 
requires, however, that unreliable or irrelevant information not be considered at 
sentencing; to the extent any unreliable information in the presentence reports is utilized 
as a basis for imposing sentence, due process is violated. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1072; 
Howell. 707 P.2d at 118. 
In this case, defense counsel challenged the accuracy of the presentence report at 
sentencing. The state concedes that Mr. Maroney challenged the accuracy of the 
information indicating that he had received sex offender treatment in the past. S.B. at 23, 
28, 29. Additionally, as outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 2 and supra at 5-7, 
Mr. Maroney also challenged the accuracy of the information suggesting he had been 
violent. R. 109:9-10. The portions of the presentence report containing multiple hearsay 
from police reports suggesting that Mr. Maroney was violent or received sex offender 
treatment were brought to the trial court's attention and should not have provided a basis 
for sentencing Mr. Maroney to prison, not only because its accuracy was challenged, but 
also because much of the information was unreliable hearsay found in old police reports. 
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R. 109:9-10. This includes the information in the presentence report about violence 
which was obtained from old police reports. It also includes the multiple hearsay 
discussions of old police reports suggesting violence found in the diagnostic evaluation 
as well as the evaluator's subsequent conclusion, based on the multiple hearsay police 
reports, that Mr. Maroney had been violent and had tried to burn down his house. 
Diagnostic evaluation at 3, 5. 
Mr. Maroney has also challenged on appeal the conclusion of the presentence 
investigator, based on reviewing old police reports, that Mr. Maroney has mental health 
issues. Appellant's brief at 26; see PSR.T 1. Most of the information relied on by the 
presentence investigator in reaching this decision was old multiple hearsay reports. See 
PSI-.10. 
Moreover, Mr. Maroney has challenged the statement in the diagnostic evaluation 
that Mr. Maroney was recruiting other victims at the time of the investigation regarding 
his nephew as well as the unreliable statements in Brian Jensen's letter indicating that 
Mr. Maroney sexually abused his nephew and the nephew was pressured into dropping 
the charges. See Appellant's brief at 27. There is no reliable information corroborating 
the claim that Mr. Maroney was recruiting other victims, that he had sexually abused his 
nephew, or that the nephew was pressured into dropping the charges. 
The state seems to suggest that if there is other information corroborating the 
multiple hearsay reports, even if that corroboration is very general, the multiple hearsay 
15 
reports can stand. On the contrary, Howell, Johnson and due process require that such 
unreliable and, in this case, inflammatory material not be considered at sentencing. 
While Pat Byrd did tell the presentence investigator that Mr. Maroney had been violent, 
the statement from an angry and hurt ex-wife carries different weight when a stack of 
hearsay is added to it. The multiple hearsay required "some minimal indicium of 
reliability beyond mere allegation" to meet due process requirements. Johnson, 856 P.2d 
at 1072. Pat Byrd's allegations to the presentence investigator did not supply the needed 
indicium of reliability to police reports instigated by her many years ago. Moreover, 
regardless of whether additional information supporting an allegation exists, fairness and 
due process require that multiple hearsay not appear in presentence reports or operate as 
a basis for imposing a harsher sentence. 
As a final matter, the Court found prejudice in Johnson where the trial court 
considered the unreliable evidence in imposing sentence. IJL at 1073. In this case where 
the sentencing court considered the unreliable material, a new sentencing hearing is 
required. Alternatively, even if the sentence is not overturned, the unreliable multiple 
hearsay should be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Daniel Maroney respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his sentence and remand his case for resentencing. Appellant also requests that the case 
be remanded so that the trial court can determine the relevance and accuracy of contested 
16 
information. Additionally, Appellant requests that unreliable and inflammatory 
information be stricken. 
SUBMITTED this 32** day of March, 2004. 
JOXN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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